Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single out the most desirable outcomes in terms of appropriate notions of worth distributions, which are usually called solution concepts. Motivated by the fact that decisions taken by realistic players cannot involve unbounded resources, recent computer science literature reconsidered the definition of such concepts by advocating the relevance of assessing the amount of resources needed for their computation in terms of their computational complexity. By following this avenue of research, the paper provides a complete picture of the complexity issues arising with three prominent solution concepts for coalitional games with transferable utility, namely, the core, the kernel, and the bargaining set, whenever the game worth-function is represented in some reasonable compact form (otherwise, if the worths of all coalitions are explicitly listed, the input sizes are so large that complexity problems are-artificially-trivial). The starting investigation point is the setting of graph games, about which various open questions were stated in the literature. The paper gives an answer to these questions, and in addition provides new insights on the setting, by characterizing the computational complexity of the three concepts in some relevant generalizations and specializations.
Introduction
Coalitional games have been introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] to characterize stable payoff distributions in scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A coalitional game (with transferable utility) can abstractly be Email addresses: ggreco@mat.unical.it (Gianluigi Greco), emalizia@deis.unical.it (Enrico Malizia), palopoli@deis.unical.it (Luigi Palopoli), scarcello@deis.unical.it (Francesco Scarcello) modelled as a pair G = N, v , where N is a finite set of players, and where v is a function associating with each coalition S ⊆ N a certain worth v(S) ∈ R that players in S may obtain by collaborating with each other. The outcome of G is an imputation, i.e., a vector of payoffs (x i ) i∈N meant to specify the distribution of the total worth v(N ) granted to each player in N . Imputations are required to be efficient, i.e., i∈N x i = v(N ), and individually rational, i.e., x i ≥ v({i}), for each i ∈ N . In the following, the set of all imputations of G is denoted by X(G).
It is easily seen that, for any given coalitional game G, the set X(G) might even contain infinitely many payoff vectors. In this context, a fundamental problem is to single out the most desirable ones in terms of appropriate notions of worth distributions, which are usually called solution concepts. Traditionally, this question has been studied in economics and game theory in the light of providing arguments and counterarguments about why such proposals are reasonable mathematical renderings of the intuitive concepts of fairness and stability. For instance, well-known and widely-accepted solution concepts are the Shapely value, the core, the kernel, the bargaining set, and the nucleolus (see, e.g., [2] ). Each solution concept defines a set of outcomes that are referred to with the name of the underlying concept-e.g., the "core of a game" is the set of those outcomes satisfying the conditions associated with the concept of core.
More recently, Deng and Papadimitriou [3] reconsidered the definition of solution concepts for coalitional games from a computer science perspective, by arguing that decisions taken by realistic agents cannot involve unbounded resources to support reasoning [3, 4] , and by suggesting to formally capture the bounded rationality principle by assessing the amount of resources needed to compute solution concepts in terms of their computational complexity [3, 5] . In particular, it has been pointed out that such questions related to the complexity of solution concepts are of particular interest whenever worth functions are encoded in some succinct way, e.g., they are given in terms of polynomially computable functions [3] . Indeed, under the naïve perspective of explicitly listing all associations of coalitions with their worths, the exponential blow-up of the input representation (w.r.t. the number of involved players) would hide the intrinsic complexity of the solutions concepts. Coalitional games whose worth functions are encoded without necessarily listing all coalition worths are called compact games. In fact, inspired by the approach of Deng and Papadimitriou [3] , the computational complexity of various solution concepts over different classes of compact games has intensively been studied in the last few years (see, e.g., [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] ).
In this paper, we continue along the line of research initiated by Deng and Papadimitriou, by analyzing the computational complexity of three prominent solutions concepts (the core, the kernel, and the bargaining set) over classes of compact games. Before illustrating our contribution, we next provide details on the classes of games considered in the paper and overview the relevant related literature. 
Compactly Specified Games: Graph Games and Marginal Contribution Nets
Graph Games. The setting of graph games is precisely the one analyzed by Deng and Papadimitriou [3] . In graph games, worths for coalitions over a set N of players are defined based on a weighted undirected graph G = (N, E), w , whose nodes in N correspond to the players, and where the list w encodes the edge weighting function, so that w(e) ∈ R is the weight associated with the edge e ∈ E. Then, the worth of an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ N is defined as the sum of the weights associated with the edges contained in S, i.e., as the value v(S) = e∈E|e⊆S w(e). Example 1.1. Consider the graph game in Figure 1 formed by the players in {a, b, c, d}. There, the coalition {a, b} gets a worth v({a, b}) = 2, while the coalition {a, b, d} gets a worth v({a, b, d}) = 3 + 2 − 1 = 4. Note that the graph encodes 2 4 coalition worths, via 5 weights only. In such a representation, O(n 2 ) weights succinctly encode the 2 n coalition worths, where n is the number of players.
⊳ Within the setting of graph games, Deng and Papadimitriou [3] characterized the intrinsic complexity of various tasks, mainly focusing on problems related to the core. For instance, they showed that checking whether the core is non-empty and that checking whether a payoff vector belongs to the core are co-NP-complete problems. Moreover, they provided a polynomial-time computable closed-form characterization for the Shapely value, and showed that this value coincides with the (pre)nucleolus. And, finally, they completed the picture of the complexity issues arising with graph games by showing the NPhardness of deciding whether a payoff vector belongs to the bargaining set and by conjecturing the following two results on graph games: (C1) Deciding whether a payoff vector belongs to the bargaining set is Π P 2 -complete; and (C2) Deciding whether a payoff vector belongs to the kernel is NP-hard.
Marginal Contribution Nets. A class of compact games that received considerable attention in the last few years is that of (games encoded via) marginal contribution networks, proposed by Ieong and Shoham [6] . A marginal contribution network (short: MC-net) is constituted by a set of rules, each one having the form: {pattern} → value, where a pattern is a conjunction that may include both positive and negative literals, with each literal denoting a player, and value is the additive contribution associated with this pattern. A rule is said to apply to a coalition S if all the players whose literals occur positively in the pattern belong to S, and all the players whose literals occur negatively in the pattern do not belong to S. When more than one rule applies to a coalition, the value for that coalition is given by the contribution of all those rules, i.e., by the sum of their values. If no rule applies, then the value for the coalition is set to zero, by default. Example 1.2. Consider the following marginal contribution network inclunding the following three rules {a∧b} → 5, {b} → 2, and {a∧¬b} → 3, over the players in {a, b}.
The network defines a coalitional game such that: v({a}) = 3 (the third rule applies), v({b}) = 2 (the second rule applies), and v({a, b}) = 5 + 2 = 7 (both the first and the second rules apply, but not the third one).
⊳
The "structure" of player interactions in MC-nets is represented via their associated agent graphs [6] . The agent graph associated with an MC-net is the undirected graph whose nodes are the players of the game, and where for each rule {pattern} → value, the subgraph induced over the players occurring together in pattern is a clique, weighted by value.
For any graph game G = (N, E), w , there is an equivalent MC-net representation having the same size, and whose "structure" is preserved in that its associated agent graph coincides with G. Indeed, given any game specified via the graph G = (N, E), w , we can just create the rule {i ∧ j} → w(e), for each edge e = {i, j} ∈ E (cf. [6] ). However, the converse is not true, since MC-nets allow to express any arbitrary coalitional game, while graph games are not fully expressive. For instance, graph games cannot model a scenario where a group of agents S has value of 1 if, and only if, |S| > |N |/2 (see [6] , for details on the expressiveness of the frameworks).
In the light of the above observations, hardness results for graph games immediately hold over marginal contribution networks. For instance, checking whether a payoff vector is in the core and checking whether the core is non-empty are co-NP-hard problems on MC-nets. Symmetrically, membership results for MC-nets also hold for graph games, even when they are established over some "structurally" restricted classes of games (because the structure is preserved). For instance, on marginal contribution networks associated with acyclic agent graphs or, more generally, with agent graphs having bounded treewidth [11] , Ieong and Shoham [6] showed that deciding whether a payoff vector is in the core and deciding the non-emptiness of the core are feasible in polynomial time; therefore, these feasibility results immediately apply to graph games.
Moreover, Ieong and Shoham [6] proved that checking whether a payoff vector is in the core of a game encoded via marginal contribution networks is in co-NP (as for the class of graph games). However, they left as an intriguing open problem the following (which, in fact, does not follow from the corresponding result on graph games):
(O1) Is the problem of deciding core non-emptiness over MC-nets feasible in co-NP?
Indeed, they observed that the "obvious" certificate of non-emptiness of the core based on the Bondareva-Shapley theorem is exponential in size. Thus, it cannot help deriving the corresponding membership in co-NP. And, in fact, different technical machineries have to be used for facing the question.
Contributions
In this paper, we analyze the computational complexity of the core, the kernel, and the bargaining set over graph games and marginal contribution networks. In particular, we show that conjectures (C1) and (C2) by Deng and Papadimitriou are correct, and we provide a positive answer to question (O1) by Ieong and Shoham. In detail , as our main technical contributions, we show that:
◮ On graph games, checking whether a payoff vector is in the kernel is NPhard, and actually ∆ P 2 -complete; ◮ On graph games, checking whether a payoff vector is in the bargaining set is Π P 2 -complete; and, ◮ On marginal contribution networks, checking whether the core is nonempty is feasible in co-NP.
These main achievements come, however, not alone in the research reported in the paper. Indeed, we go beyond and study the computational issues arising in relevant generalizations and specializations of the setting of graph games.
Generalizations:
We consider an abstraction of compact coalitional games that is based on assuming that the worth function is provided as an oracle operating over some given structure encoding the game. In particular, we analyze the cases where each oracle call requires deterministic and nondeterministic polynomial time (w.r.t. the size of the game), respectively; that is, the cases where the oracle encodes a function in FP or in NPSV, respectively. As an example, graph games and marginal contribution networks are just two instances of the former setting. Instead, NPSV oracles are much more powerful, since they can be used to encode games where coalition worths are the result of complex algorithmic procedures, such as scheduling, planning or routing activities.
Within this abstract setting, we show that nothing has to be paid for the succinctness of the specifications, since all the membership results that hold for graph games also hold for any such class as of compact games. Notably and surprisingly, this is true not only for games whose worth functions can be computed by a deterministic polynomial-time oracle, but even for the cases where NPSV oracles are used. Indeed, we show that: ◮ On games defined via non-deterministic polynomial time oracles, the problems of checking whether a payoff vector belongs to the core, the kernel, and the bargaining set are (still) feasible in co-NP, ∆ P 2 , Π P 2 , respectively; and ◮ On games defined via non-deterministic polynomial time oracles, checking whether the core is non-empty is (still) feasible in co-NP.
Specializations: Finally, by following the perspective adopted by Ieong and Shoham [6] , we analyze the complexity of the kernel in "structurally restricted" graph games. In particular, we show that this concept can be expressed in terms of an optimization problem over Monadic Second Order Logic (MSO) formulae. Based on this encoding and by exploiting Courcelle's Theorem [12] and its generalization to optimization problems due to Arnborg, Lagergren, and Seese [13] , we show that:
◮ On graph games having bounded treewidth, checking whether a payoff vector is in the kernel is feasible in polynomial time (w.r.t. the size of the game measured as the number of its nodes, plus the number of its edges, plus all the values of the weights associated with it-or, equivalently, plus the number of the bits necessary to store such weights in unary notation).
A summary of our results is reported in Figure 2 , where Core-Check, Kernel-Check, and BargainingSet-Check denote the problem of checking whether a payoff vector belongs to the core, the kernel, and the bargaining set, respectively, and where Core-NonEmptiness denotes the problem of checking core non-emptiness-in fact, recall that kernel and bargaining set are always not empty (unless there is no imputation at all) [2] , and hence the corresponding non-emptiness problem is immaterial for them.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries on computational complexity are reported in Section 2. An abstract framework for compact games is discussed in detail in Section 3. The complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set is analyzed in Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Eventually, a few final remarks and discussions on some open problems are reported in Section 7.
Preliminaries on Computational Complexity
In this section we recall some basic definitions about complexity theory, by referring the reader to the work of Johnson [14] for more on this.
2.1. The Complexity of Decision Problems: P, NP, and co-NP Decision problems are maps from strings (encoding the input instance over a fixed alphabet, e.g., the binary alphabet {0, 1}) to the set {"yes", "no"}. The class P is the set of decision problems that can be solved by a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time with respect to the input size, that is, with respect to the length of the string that encodes the input instance. For a given input x, its size is usually denoted by ||x||.
Throughout the paper, we shall often refer to computations done by nondeterministic Turing machines, too. Recall that these are Turing machines that, at some points of the computation, may not have one single next action to perform, but a choice between several possible next actions. A non-deterministic Turing machine answers a decision problem if, on any input x, (i) there is at least one sequence of choices leading to halt in an accepting state if x is a "yes" instance (such a sequence is called accepting computation path); and (ii) all possible sequences of choices lead to a rejecting state if x is a "no" instance.
The class of decision problems that can be solved by non-deterministic Turing machines in polynomial time is denoted by NP. Problems in NP enjoy a remarkable property: any "yes" instance x has a certificate of it being a "yes" instance, which has polynomial length and which can be checked in polynomial time (in the size ||x||). As an example, deciding whether a Boolean formula Φ over the variables X 1 , . . . , X n is satisfiable, i.e., deciding whether there exists some truth assignment to the variables making Φ true, is a well-known problem in NP; in fact, any satisfying truth assignment for Φ is obviously a certificate that Φ is a "yes" instance, i.e., that Φ is satisfiable.
The class of problems whose complementary problems are in NP is denoted by co-NP. As an example, the problem of deciding whether a Boolean formula Φ is not satisfiable is in co-NP. Of course, the class P is contained in both NP and co-NP.
Further Complexity Classes: The Polynomial Hierarchy
Throughout the paper, we shall also refer to a type of computation called computation with oracles. Intuitively, oracles are subroutines which are supposed to have unary cost.
The classes Σ P k , Π P k , and ∆ P k , forming the polynomial hierarchy, are defined as follows:
where co-Σ P k denotes the class of problems whose complementary problem is solvable in Σ P k . Here, Σ P k (resp., ∆ P k ) models computability by a non-deterministic (resp., deterministic) polynomial-time Turing machine that may use an oracle in Σ A well-known problem at the k-th level of the polynomial hierarchy is deciding the validity of a quantified Boolean formula with k quantifier alternations. A quantified Boolean formula (short: QBF) with k quantifier alternations has the form Q 1X1 Q 2X2 ...Q kXk Φ, where
, and Φ is a Boolean formula over the variables in k i=1X i . The set of all quantified Boolean formulas with k quantifier alternations and Q 1 = ∃ (resp., Q 1 = ∀) is denoted by QBF k,∃ (resp., QBF k,∀ ). Deciding the validity of a quantified Boolean formula in QBF k,∃ (resp., QBF k,∀ ) is a well-known problem in Σ P k (resp., Π P k ). Note that for k = 1, this problem coincides with the problem of deciding whether the Boolean formula Φ is satisfiable (resp., not satisfiable), which is indeed in NP (resp., co-NP).
Reductions among Decision Problems
A decision problem A 1 is polynomially reducible to a decision problem A 2 , denoted by A 1 ≤ p A 2 , if there is a polynomial time computable function h (called reduction) such that, for every x, h(x) is defined and x is a "yes" instance of A 1 if, and only if, h(x) is a "yes" instance of A 2 . A decision problem A is complete for a class C of the polynomial hierarchy (at any level k ≥ 1, i.e., beyond P) if A belongs to C and every problem in C is polynomially reducible to A. Thus, problems that are complete for C are the most difficult problems in C.
It is worthwhile observing that all problems mentioned in this section are known to be complete for the classes in which their membership has been pointed out. In particular, deciding the validity of a QBF k,∃ (resp., QBF k,∀ ) formula is the prototypical Σ P k -complete (resp., Π P k -complete) problem.
Complexity Classes of Functions
All the aforementioned problems are decision ones, but very often we are interested in search problems where, for any given instance, a (non-Boolean) solution must be computed. The complexity classes of functions allow us to distinguish such problems according to their intrinsic difficulties, which is particularly relevant when their associated decision problems belong to the same complexity class.
Let a finite alphabet Σ with at least two elements be given. A (partial) multivalued (MV) function f : Σ * → Σ * associates no, one or several outcomes (results) with each input string. Let f (x) stand for the set of possible results of f on an input string x; thus, we write y ∈ f (x) if y is a value of f on the input string x. Define dom(f ) = {x | ∃y(y ∈ f (x))} and graph(f ) = { x, y | x ∈ dom(f ), y ∈ f (x)}. If x ∈dom(f ), we will say that f is undefined at x. The function f is total if dom(f ) = Σ
* . An MV function f is polynomially balanced if, for each x, the size of each result in f (x) is polynomially bounded in the size of x.
The class NPMV is defined as the set of all MV functions f such that both (i) f is polynomially balanced and (ii) graph(f ) is in NP. By analogy, the class NPMV g is defined as the class of all polynomially-balanced multivalued functions f for which graph(f ) is in P. If we deal with (partial) single-valued functions, we get the corresponding classes NPSV and NPSV g , respectively [15] .
A transducer is a (possibly, non-deterministic) Turing machine T on the alphabet Σ with a read-only input tape, a read-write work tape, and a writeonly output tape. For any string x ∈ Σ * , we say that T accepts x if T has an accepting computation-path on x. For each x ∈ Σ * accepted by T , we denote by T (x) the set of all strings that are written by T on the output tape in its accepting computation-paths on input string x. Thus, every transducer is associated with some MV function f (we say that T computes f ) such that, for each x ∈ Σ * , f (x) = T (x) if x is accepted by T ; otherwise, f is undefined at x (i.e., x ∈ dom(f )).
Note that the class FP consists of all functions that are computed by deterministic Turing transducers in polynomial time.
Functions in NPMV are characterized in terms of Turing machines as follows. It is worthwhile noting the difference between the two classes NPMV g and NPMV, which contains more complex functions than NPMV g (assuming P = NP). For instance, consider the problem of computing the partial MV function f H that, given a graph G, outputs the Hamiltonian cycles of G (if any). This function is in NPMV g since graph(f H ) is polynomially balanced and decidable in deterministic polynomial time (for any pair G, C , just check whether C is a Hamiltonian cycle of G). Let us consider now the weighted version of this problem, where the input graph G is edge-weighted, and the function values are the weights of Hamiltonian cycles of G (if any). Then, this partial MV function, say f WH , belongs to NPMV but not to NPMV g (unless P = NP). Indeed, deciding whether a given pair G, w (graph,weight) belongs to graph(f WH ) is clearly NP-complete (one needs some Hamiltonian cycle having weight w to recognize it as a correct function value).
A Formal Framework for Compact Representations
Graph games and marginal contribution networks are two prominent examples of coalitional games whose worth functions are defined in terms of some suitable (combinatorial) structure, instead of listing the worths of all coalitions. In this section, we generalize these two schemes by formalizing the notion of compact representation for coalitional games.
Any compact representation R defines suitable encodings for a set of coalitional games, denoted by C(R). If all games may be represented by R, we say that this representation is complete. For any game G ∈ C(R), R defines an encoding ξ R (G) of the game, and a worth function v R (·, ·) that, given ξ R (G) and a set S of players of G, outputs the worth v R (ξ R (G), S) associated with the coalition S according to G.
For instance, consider the graph-games representation GG: any game G ∈ C(GG) is encoded as a weighted graph ξ GG (G), and the worth function v GG (ξ GG (G), S) is computed for every coalition S by taking the sum of the weights of all edges of ξ GG (G) included in S.
For the case of the marginal-contribution nets compact-representation MCN , any game G is encoded by a set of rules ξ MCN (G), and the worth-function v MCN (ξ MCN (G), S) computes the worth of S as the sum of the values of those rules fired by players in S.
Definition 3.1. We say that R is a polynomial-time compact representation (short: P-representation) if the worth-function v R (·, ·) belongs to FP, i.e., it is polynomial-time computable by a deterministic transducer.
We say that R is a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation (short: NP-representation) if the worth-function v R (·, ·) belongs to NPSV, i.e., it is polynomial-time computable by a non-deterministic transducer.
Note that both GG and MCN are based on worth functions that are efficiently computable, and in fact both of them are polynomial-time compact representations.
An interesting feature of a compact representation is its expressive power. Firstly, one may ask whether R is complete or not, that is, whether it is the case that every coalitional game belongs to C(R). For instance MCN is a complete representation, while GG is not. However, as a consequence of completeness, for some games MCN is not able to provide succinct representations. In fact, it is known that there are games whose MCN encodings have size exponential in the number of players [16] . Therefore, for a pair of compact representations R 1 and R 2 , one may wonder about the relationship between C(R 1 ) and C(R 2 ), and about the ability to represent games in a more o less succinct way. Formally, we say that R 2 is at least as expressive (and succinct) as R 1 , denoted by R 1 e R 2 , if there exists a function f in FP that translates a game ξ R1 (G) represented in R 1 into an equivalent game ξ R2 (G) represented in R 2 , that is, into a game with the same worth function as the former one. More precisely, we require that, for ξ
, for each coalition of players S in the game G.
For instance, it can easily be shown that GG e MCN . In the rest of the paper, we shall provide complexity results for GG, MCN , and for arbitrary P and NP compact representations.
For the sake of presentation, whenever a compact representation R is understood, we just write G instead of ξ R (G), and
The Complexity of the Core
The concept of the core goes back to the work of Edgeworth [17] and it has been formalized by Gillies [18] . To review its definition, we need to state some preliminary concepts and notations, which will extensively be used throughout the paper.
For any coalition S ⊆ N , let |S| denote the cardinality of S, and let R S be the |S|-dimensional real coordinate space, whose coordinates are labeled by the members of S; in particular, given a payoff vector x ∈ R S , x i denotes the component associated with the player i ∈ S. A vector x ∈ R S is called an S-feasible vector if i∈S x i = v(S). The value i∈S x i will be simply denoted by x(S) in the following. Let G = N, v be a coalitional game, and let x be an imputation taken from the set X(G) of all imputations of G-recall from the Introduction that such an x must be efficient, i.e., i∈N x i = v(N ), and individually rational, i.e., x i ≥ v({i}), for each i ∈ N . The pair (y, S) is an objection to x if y is an S-feasible payoff vector such that y k > x k for all k ∈ S.
Definition 4.1. The core C (G) of a coalitional game G = N, v is the set of all imputations x to which there is no objection; that is,
Thus, an imputation x in the core is "stable" precisely because there is no coalition whose members will receive a higher payoff than in x by leaving the grand-coalition.
It is easily seen that Definition 4.1 can be equivalently restated as the set of all solutions satisfying the following inequalities [see, e.g., 2]:
In particular, the last inequality, combined with its opposite in (1), enforces the efficiency of solutions; moreover, inequalities in (1) over singleton coalitions enforce their individual rationality. 
In fact, we can show that C (G) is empty. To this end, consider coalitions S 1 = {a, b}, S 2 = {a, c} and S 3 = {b, c} and the worths associated with them by the worth function. An imputation x to be in C (G) have to satisfy the following three conditions:
Summing up these inequalities we obtain that 2x a + 2x b + 2x c ≥ 90, implying that x a + x b + x c ≥ 45. Thus, the core of G is empty because the grand-coalition would need to receive 45 instead of v(N ) = 42 in order to satisfy the claims of S 1 , S 2 and S 3 .
Consider, instead, the game G ′ = N, v ′ whose worth function v ′ is the same as that of G except for the grand-coalition for which v ′ (N ) = 45. Then, it is easily checked that the imputation
As it emerged from the above example, the core of a game can be empty. In fact, checking whether this is not the case is a co-NP-hard problem for graph games [3] . It is easy to see that this hardness result can be extended easily to all compact game representations at least as expressive (and succinct) as graph games.
Proposition 4.3. Let R be any compact representation such that GG e R (e.g., R = MCN ). On the class C(R), Core-NonEmptiness is co-NP-hard.
Proof. From the co-NP-hardness for graph games [3] , we know that there is a polynomial-time reduction f 1 from any co-NP problem Υ to the core nonemptiness problem for graph games. Moreover, recall from Section 3 that GG e R means that there exists a polynomial-time function f 2 that translates any graph game ξ GG (G) into an equivalent game f 2 (ξ GG (G)) belonging to C(R), that is, into a game with the same worth function and thus the same core as the former one. Therefore, the composition of f 1 and f 2 is a polynomial-time reduction from Υ to the core non-emptiness problem for games in C(R).
In fact, for the case of graph games, the precise complexity of the nonemptiness problem for the core is known, as Deng and Papadimitriou [3] have shown that this problem is co-NP-complete. However, it was open whether the membership still holds for marginal contribution networks [6] and, possibly, for more general compact representations. In this section, we positively answer this question and show that in fact membership in co-NP holds for any class of games C(R) associated with an NP representation scheme R.
In order to get this result, we have to identify some succinct certificate that the core of a game is empty. Indeed, it was observed that the "obvious" certificate of non-emptiness of the core based on the Bondareva-Shapley theorem is exponential in size [6] . The technical machinery that we need is originally due to Helly, who proved the following beautiful result on families of convex sets. Proposition 4.4 (Helly's Theorem [19, 20] ). Let C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } be a finite family of convex sets in R n , where m > n. If
However, we next provide a direct proof of the existence of such succinct certificates of infeasibility. Indeed, we believe that our proof provides a nice geometrical interpretation of Helly's Theorem for the convex sets related with the core, and thus it may be of independent interest for the reader. The approach is based on the well-known fact that, because of inequalities (1) and (2), the core of a coalitional game over N players is a polyhedral set of R N .
Preliminaries on Polyhedral Sets
We next give some useful definitions and facts about polyhedral sets. We refer the interested reader to any text on this subject for further readings (see, e.g., [21, 22] ).
Let n > 0 be any natural number. A Polyhedral Set (or Polyhedron) P of R n is the intersection of a finite set S of closed halfspaces of R n . Note that in this paper we always assume, unless otherwise stated, that n > 0. We denote this polyhedron by Pol(S).
Recall that a hyperplane H of R n is a set of points {x ∈ R n |a T x = b}, where a ∈ R n and b ∈ R. The closed halfspace H + is the set of points {x ∈ R n |a T x ≥ b}. We say that these points satisfy H + . We denote the points that do not satisfy this halfspace by H − , i.e.,
− is an open halfspace. We say that H determines H + and H − . Define the opposite of H + as the set of pointsH
it is the set of points {x ∈ R n |a T x ≤ b}. Let P = Pol(S) be a polyhedron and H a hyperplane. Then, H cuts P if both H + and H − contain points of P , and we say that H passes through P , if there is a non-empty touching set C = H ∩ P . Furthermore, we say that H supports P , or that it is a supporting hyperplane for P , if H does not cut P , but passes through P , i.e., it just touches P , as the only common points of H and P are those in their intersection C. Moreover, we say that H + is a supporting halfspace for P if H is a supporting hyperplane for P and P ⊆ H + . Note that P ⊆ Pol(S ′ ) for any set of halfspaces S ′ ⊆ S, since the latter polyhedron is obtained from the intersection of a smaller set of halfspaces than P . We say that such a polyhedron is a supporting polyhedron for P .
Recall that, for any set A ⊆ R n , its dimension dim(A) is the dimension of its affine hull. For instance, if A consists of two points, or it is a segment, its affine hull is a line and thus dim(A) = 1. By definition, dim(∅) = −1, while single points have dimension 0. For any hyperplane H, dim(H) = n − 1, while the intersection C of any pair of (non-parallel) hyperplanes H 1 and H 2 has dimension n − 2.
Every hyperplane H has precisely two normal vectors, while its associated halfspace H + has one normal vector, that is, the normal vector of H that belongs to H + . The dihedral angle δ(H For such halfspaces, in this paper we always consider rotations whose axis is the (affine) subspace C = H 1 ∩ H 2 of dimension n − 2, so we avoid to explicitly mention rotation axes, hereafter. Note that such rotations are uniquely identified by their amount (angle) of rotation, which is the one degree of freedom. Formally, define the result of a rotation of a halfspace H A set F ⊆ P is a face of P if either F = ∅, or F = P , or if there exists a supporting hyperplane H F of P such that F is their touching set, i.e., F = H F ∩ P . In the latter case, we say that F is a proper face of P . A facet of P is a proper face of P having the largest possible dimension, that is, whose dimension is dim(P ) − 1.
The following facts are well known [21] :
1. For any facet F of P , there is a halfspace H + ∈ S such that F = H + ∩ P . We say that H + generates F . 2. For any proper face F of P , there is a facet
Separating Polyhedra from a Few Supporting Halfspaces
We start with a pair of technical results. With a little abuse of notation, since coalitions correspond to the inequalities (1) and hence with the associated halfspaces of R n , we use hereafter interchangeably these terms. We next show that, whenever a full-dimensional polyhedron P = Pol(S) of R n is separated from some hyperplane H P , there exists a subset of at most n halfspaces corresponding to facets of P that define a larger polyhedron of R n (a rough approximation of P ), which is still separated from H P . We first give the proof idea, with the help of Figure 4 . For the sake of intuition, imagine that H + P is the inequality (2) associated with the grand-coalition, while the set S corresponds to the other inequalities (1), whence in this case the core is empty. If there is a facet F of P that is parallel to H P , we are trivially done, because its associated halfspace already provides the desired separated polyhedron, succinctly described by just one inequality. Otherwise such a face F has a smaller dimension but, from Fact 2, there exists a facet F ′ of P such that F ⊂ F ′ . In the three-dimensional example shown in Figure 4 , F is the vertex at the bottom of the diamond, H + F is the halfspace (anti-)parallel to H P that contains F (but it is not associated with any inequality generating P ), and F ′ is some facet on its "dark side." Let C = H F ∩ H F ′ , and consider the rotation of H + F towards H + F ′ of a negative angle β (we go on the opposite direction w.r.t. H + F ′ ) that first touches P , say H F ′′ . As illustrated in Figure 4 , where the face F ′′ is an edge of the diamond, F ′′ properly includes F and its dimension is at least d > dim(F ). From the above lemma, H + F is a supporting halfspace of the polyhedron Pol(H + F ′ , H + F ′′ ), called its roof, which contains P and is separated from H P . However, we are not satisfied because we would like that such a polyhedron is described by (at most n) halfspaces taken from S, and H + F ′′ does not belong to S, in general (as in our example, where it does not generate a facet of P . Then, we proceed inductively, by observing that H + F ′′ is a supporting halfspace for Pol(H
)-its roof, whose faces have higher dimension than F ′′ . In the running example, they are both facets of the diamond, and hence the property immediately holds. In general, the procedure may continue, encountering each time at least one facet and one more face with a higher dimension than the current one. The formal proof follows. Lemma 4.6. Let P = Pol(S) be a polyhedron of R n with dim(P ) = n, and H + F a supporting halfspace of P whose touching set is F . Then, there exists a set of halfspaces
F is a supporting halfspace of Pol(H F ), and their touching set C is such that F ⊆ C.
Proof. The proof is by induction. Base case: If dim(F ) = n − 1 we have that the touching face F = H + F ∩ P is a facet of P . Thus, from Fact 1, F is generated by some halfspace H + ⊆ S such that H + ∩ P = F , as for H F . Since dim(F ) = dim(H) = dim(H F ) = n − 1, it easily follows that in fact H = H F holds. Thus, H + F is trivially a supporting halfspace of H + , and this case is proved: just take H F = {H + } and note that |H F | = 1. Inductive step: By the induction hypothesis, the property holds for any supporting halfspace H + F ′ of P such that its touching face
Since F is not a facet, from Fact 2 there exists a facet 
It follows that the touching set of H + F and Pol(H F ) includes F . Indeed, this touching set includes (
= n−1 and the base case applies. Moreover, dim(F ′′ ) > dim(F ) = d − 1 and thus, by the induction hypothesis, we obtain
Let G = N, v be a game with transferable payoffs. A coalition set S ⊆ 2 N is a certificate of emptiness (or infeasibility certificate) for the core of G if the intersection of Pol(S) with the grand-coalition halfspace (2) is empty. In fact, this definition is motivated by the following observation. Let P be the polyhedron of R n obtained as the intersection of all halfspaces (1). Since S is a subset of all possible coalitions, P ⊆ Pol(S). Therefore, if the intersection of Pol(S) with the grand-coalition halfspace (2) is empty, the intersection of this halfspace with P is empty, as well.
Theorem 4.7. Let G = N, v be a game with transferable payoffs. If the core of G is empty, there is a certificate of emptiness S for it such that |S| ≤ |N |.
Proof. Let n = |N | and P be the polyhedron of R n obtained as the intersection of all halfspaces (1). Since we are not considering the feasibility constraint (2), there is no upper-bound on the values of any variable x i , and thus it is easy to see that P = ∅ and dim(P ) = n.
Let H + P be the halfspace defined by the grand-coalition inequality (2) . If the core of G is empty, the whole set of inequalities has no solution, that is, Figure 4 , on the left. By construction, H
is a supporting hyperplane of P , and H + F is a supporting halfspace of P . Let F be the touching set of H F with P , and let d = dim(F ). In Figure 4 , it is the vertex at the bottom of the diamond P . From Lemma 4.6, there is a set of halfspaces S associated with inequalities from (1), with |S| ≤ n − d, and such that H + F is a supporting halfspace for Pol(S). It follows that H + P ∩ Pol(S) = ∅, whence S is a certificate of emptiness for the core of G. Finally, note that the largest cardinality of S is n, and corresponds to the case dim(F ) = 0, that is, to the case where the face F is just a vertex. Therefore the maximum cardinality of the certificate is n. In our three-dimensional example, the certificate is {H
}, as shown in Figure 4 , on the right.
Note that the above proof is constructive and has a nice geometrical interpretation. Exploiting the above property, we can now determine the complexity of core non-emptiness for any (non-deterministic) polynomial-time compact representation.
Theorem 4.8. Let R be a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation. On the class C(R), Core-NonEmptiness is feasible in co-NP.
Proof. Let G = N, v be a game with transferable payoffs in C(R). If its core is empty, from Theorem 4.7, there is a certificate of emptiness S, with |S| ≤ n, where n is the number of players of G. For the sake of presentation, let us briefly sketch the case of a polynomial-time deterministic representation R. In this case, a non-deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time may check that the core is empty by performing the following operations: (i) guess of the set S, i.e., of the coalitions of players corresponding to the halfspaces in S; (ii) computation in deterministic polynomial time of the worth v R (ξ R (G), S), for each S ∈ S, and for the grand-coalition N ; and (iii) check of the property Pol(S) ∩ H + P = ∅, where H + P is the halfspace defined by the grand-coalition inequality (2) . Note that the last step is feasible in polynomial time, as we have to solve a system consisting of just n + 1 linear inequalities.
The case of a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation R is a simple variation where, at step (ii), for each S ∈ S, the computation of the worth is an NPSV problem, and thus the machine should work as follows: it guesses the value w = v R (ξ R (G), S) and a witness y that (ξ R (G), S), w ∈ graph(v R ) (which is an NP task in this case); then, by exploiting y, it checks in (deterministic) polynomial-time that actually (ξ R (G), S), w belongs to the graph of the worth function v R .
The above membership result and Proposition 4.3 imply that the non-emptiness problem for the core is co-NP-complete for all NP representations at least as expressive as the graph games.
Corollary 4.9. Let R be any non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation such that GG e R (e.g., R = MCN ). On the class C(R), CoreNonEmptiness is co-NP-complete.
The Complexity of the Kernel
The kernel is a solution concept introduced by Davis and Maschler [23] . Let us start by recalling its formal definition.
For any pair of players i and j of a coalitional game G = N, v , we denote by I i,j the set of all coalitions containing player i but not player j. The excess e(S, x) = v(S) − x(S) of the generic coalition S at the imputation x ∈ X(G) is a measure of the dissatisfaction of S at x. Define the surplus s i,j (x) of player i against player j at an imputation x as the value s i,j (x) = max S∈Ii,j e(S, x) = max S∈Ii,j (v(S) − x(S)).
Definition 5.1. The kernel K (G) of a TU game G = N, v is the set:
Intuitively, the surplus of player i against j at x is the highest payoff that player i can gain (or the minimal amount i can lose, if it is a negative value) without the cooperation of j, by assuming to form coalitions with other players that are satisfied at x; thus, s i,j (x) is the weight of a possible threat of i against j. In particular, player i has more "bargaining power" than j at x if s i,j (x) > s j,i (x); however, player j is immune to such threat whenever x j = v({j}), since in this case j can obtain v({j}) even by operating on her own. We say that player i outweighs player j at x if s i,j (x) > s j,i (x) and x j > v({j}). The kernel is then the set of all imputations where no player outweighs another one. It is easily verified that the imputation x such that x a = 4, x b = 14, and x c = 24 is in the kernel of G. Indeed, we note first that every player in N receives in x a payoff strictly greater than what she is able to obtain by acting on her 
own. For this reason, in order for x to belong to K (G) it must be the case that s i,j (x) ≤ s j,i (x), for all distinct players i and j. By the definition of the worth function, the maximum excess that a coalition S including i and excluding j can achieve is obtained by the coalition S ∈ I i,j such that |S| = 2. By this, s i,j (x) = s j,i (x) = 2 for all pairs of different players i, j. Thus, x ∈ K (G). ⊳ It is well known that K (G) = ∅, whenever X(G) = ∅ (see, e.g., [2] ). Thus, the non-emptiness problem is trivial for this concept. Instead, as discussed by Deng and Papadimitriou [3] , it is of interest to ask for the computational complexity of deciding whether a given payoff vector belongs to the kernel. This problem was conjectured to be NP-hard by those same authors [3] , even for graph games. In the rest of the section, we firstly confirm the conjecture by actually showing that the problem is even harder and, precisely, ∆ P 2 -hard. Then, we shall show that the corresponding membership result holds on any class of games C(R), where R is an arbitrary NP representation scheme. Finally, we shall single out an island of tractability, by looking for structural restrictions imposed over graph games.
Hardness on Graph Games
We show that checking whether an imputation belongs to the kernel is ∆ P 2 -hard on graph games. The proof is based on a reduction from the problem of the lexicographically maximum satisfying assignment for Boolean formulae.
Let φ = c 1 ∧· · ·∧c m be a 3CNF Boolean formula, that is, a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form over the set {α 1 , . . . , α n } of variables that are lexicographically ordered (according to their indices) where each clause contains three literals (positive or negated variables) at most. Assume, w.l.o.g., that there is a clause in φ containing at least two literals. Based on φ, we build in polynomial time the weighted graph K(φ) = (N K , E K ), w such that (see Figure 5 for an illustration):
• The set N K of nodes (i.e, players) includes: a variable player α i , for each variable α i in φ; a clause player c j , for each clause c j in φ; a literal player ℓ i,j (either ℓ i,j = α i,j or ℓ i,j = ¬α i,j ), for each literal ℓ i (ℓ i = α i or ℓ i = ¬α i , respectively) occurring in c j ; and, two special players "chall" and "sat".
• The set E K consists of the following three types of edges.
(Positive edges): an edge {c j , ℓ i,j } with w({c j , ℓ i,j }) = 2 n+3 , for each literal ℓ i occurring in c j ; an edge {chall, α i } with w({chall, α i }) = 2 i , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n; an edge {sat, α i } with w({sat, α i }) = 2 i , for each 2 ≤ i ≤ n; the edge {sat, α 1 } with w({sat, α 1 }) = 2 1 + 2 0 .
("Penalty" edges): an edge {ℓ i,j , ℓ i ′ ,j } with w({ℓ i,j , ℓ i ′ ,j }) = −2 m+n+7 , for each pair of literals ℓ i and ℓ i ′ occurring in c j ; an edge {α i,j , ¬α i,j ′ } with w({α i,j , ¬α i,j ′ }) = −2 m+n+7 , for each variable α i occurring positively in c j and negated in c j ′ ; an edge {α i , ¬α i,j } with w({α i , ¬α i,j }) = −2 m+n+7 , for each variable α i occurring negated in c j .
("Normalizer" edge): the edge {chall, sat}, for which we set w({chall, sat}) = 1 − e∈E K |e ={chall,sat} w(e).
Note that the size of the representation of all the weights is polynomial in the number of variables and clauses of φ. Two crucial properties of the above construction are stated in the following lemma. Proof. Let P = e∈E K |e ={chall,sat},w(e)>0 w(e) be the sum of all the positive edges, but the normalizer one, in K(φ). Let us firstly observe that:
Thus, 2 m+n+7 ≥ 2×P holds. Moreover, observe that K(φ) contains at least one penalty edge, since w.l.o.g. there is a clause in φ containing at least two literals. Hence, w({chall, sat}) = 1 − e∈E K |e ={chall,sat} w(e) ≥ 1 − P + 2 m+n+7 . It follows that w({chall, sat}) ≥ 1 − P + 2 × P = 1 + P . Eventually, P ≥ D holds by definition of D and, therefore, w({chall, sat}) ≥ 1 + D, which proves (A). As for (B), given that D > 0 and P ≥ D, we may note that 2 m+n+7 ≥ 2 × P implies 2 m+n+7 > D.
Based on the above properties, we can now prove the main result.
Theorem 5.4. On the class C(GG) of graph games, Kernel-Check is ∆ P 2 -hard (even if the given payoff vector is an imputation).
Proof. Let φ = c 1 ∧· · ·∧c m be a satisfiable 3CNF formula over a set {α 1 , . . . , α n } of variables that are lexicographically ordered (according to their indices). Deciding whether α 1 (that is the lexicographically least significant variable) is true in the lexicographically maximum satisfying assignment for φ is a well-known ∆ P 2 -complete problem [24] .
Consider the graph game K(φ) = (N K , E K ), w , and the imputation x that assigns 0 to all players of K(φ), but to sat, which receives 1. In fact, x is an imputation since v(N ) = 1 because of the weight of the edge {chall, sat} (recall that w({chall, sat}) = 1 − e∈E K |e ={chall,sat} w(e)).
Beforehand, observe that, by Definition 5.1 and since sat is the only player that receives in x a payoff strictly greater than her worth as a singleton coalition, x ∈ K (K(φ)) if and only if max S∈Ii,sat e(S, x) ≤ max S∈Isat,i e(S, x), for each player i = sat. The following property further restricts the coalitions of interest and, indeed, suffices to conclude that x ∈ K (K(φ)) if and only if Now, we are going to characterize the structure of the two terms max S∈I chall,sat e(S, x) and max S∈I sat,chall e(S, x) occurring in Equation (3) by establishing a connection with satisfying assignments for φ. In particular, for any truth assignment σ, we denote by σ |= φ the fact that σ satisfies φ, and by σ(α i ) = true (resp., σ(α i ) = false) the fact that α i evaluates to true (resp., false) in σ.
Property 5.4. (2): max S∈I chall,sat e(S, x) = m×2 n+3 +max σ|=φ αi|σ(αi)=true 2 i . Let us firstly note that max S∈I chall,sat e(S, x) = max S∈I chall,sat v(S), by construction of the imputation x. Let S * be the coalition having maximum worth over all the coalitions in I chall,sat . Because of Lemma 5.3.(B) and since v({chall}) = 0, S * cannot cover any penalty edge, for otherwise S * would not be a coalition with maximum worth amongst those belonging to I chall,sat . Thus, (i) for each variable player α i ∈ S * , no literal player of the form ¬α i,j is in S * ; (ii) for each clause player c j ∈ S * , at most one literal player of the form ℓ i,j is in S * ; and, (iii) for each variable α i , S * contains no pair of literal players of the form α i,j and ¬α i,j ′ .
It follows that the worth of S * is such that: v(S * ) = |C|×2 n+3 + αi∈S * 2 i , where C is the set of the clause players c j ∈ S * for which exactly one literal player ℓ i,j is in S * ; in particular, recall that 2 i is the weight associated with the edge {chall, α i }, while 2 n+3 is the weight associated with each edge of the form {c j , ℓ i,j }. Now, let, σ be a truth assignment such that σ(α i ) = true (resp., σ(α i ) = false) if α i,j (resp., ¬α i,j ) occurs in S * for some clause c j . Note that σ may be a partial assignment, over a set of variables α ⊆ {α 1 , . . . , α n }; however, because of (iii) above, σ is non-contradictory and satisfies all the clauses whose players are in C. Eventually, since φ is satisfiable and since 2 n+3 > n i=1 2 i , because of (ii) S * will certainly contain all the m clause players (i.e., σ is a satisfying assignment for φ). That is, v(S * ) = m × 2 n+3 + αi∈S * 2 i .
Observe now that if α i,j is in S * , then α i is in S * as well, since this leads to maximize the worth of S * . Moreover, if ¬α i,j is in S * , then α i is not in S * because of (i). Thus, the assignment σ S * such that σ S * (α i ) = true (resp., σ S * (α i ) = false) if α i occurs (resp., not occurs) in S * coincides with σ when restricted over the domain of the variables in α. Therefore, σ S * is, in turn, a satisfying assignment, and we have:
We conclude the proof by showing that the above inequality cannot be strict. Indeed, assume, for the sake of contradiction, that a satisfying assignment σ exists for φ such that v(S * ) < m × 2 n+3 + αi|σ(αi)=true 2 i .
Based on σ, we can build a coalition S such that: (a) {chall, c 1 , . . . , c m } ⊆ S; (b) α i ∈ S, for each α i such that σ(α i ) = true; (c) exactly one literal ℓ i,j is in S, for each clause c j that is satisfied by ℓ i,j according to the truth values defined in σ; (d) no further player is in S.
Given that σ is a satisfying assignment, no penalty edge is covered by S. In particular, v(S) = m × 2 n+3 + αi∈S 2 i and, hence, v(S) = m × 2 n+3 + αi|σ(αi)=true 2 i . But, this is not possible since we would have a coalition
The property can be proven precisely along the same line of reasoning as in the proof of Property 5.4.(2). The differences are that: x(S) = 1 holds for each S with sat ∈ S; and that the weight associated with the edge {sat, α i } is 2 i , for each 2 ≤ i ≤ n, while it is 2 1 + 2 0 for the case where i = 1. In particular, |{α 1 | σ(α 1 ) = true}| precisely encodes the fact that an unitary weight has to be added to any assignment where α 1 evaluates to true.
We can now rewrite Equation (3) in the light of the above two properties, and conclude that x ∈ K (K(φ)) if and only if:
that is, x ∈ K (K(φ)) if and only if α 1 is true in the lexicographically maximum satisfying assignment for φ.
By the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 4.3, the above result can be immediately extended to all representations at least as expressive (and succinct) as graph games.
Corollary 5.5. Let R be any compact representation such that GG e R (e.g., R = MCN ). On the class C(R), Kernel-Check is ∆ P 2 -hard.
Membership on FNP Representation Schemes
Differently from the hardness result proven above, the corresponding membership result is routine. Anyway, the proof is reported below, for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 5.6. Let R be a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation. On the class C(R), Kernel-Check is feasible in ∆ P 2 . Proof. Let G ∈ C(R) be a coalitional game, and x be a payoff vector. Note first that, in order to check whether x is actually an imputation, we have just to compute the worths associated to all the singleton coalitions plus the worth associated to the whole set of players, which can be done in ∆ P 2 -just recall that each worth can be computed in non-deterministic polynomial-time. More in detail, for each player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we guess in polynomial time the value w i = v R (ξ R (G), {i}) and a suitable certificate c {i} , and then we check in (deterministic) polynomial time that in fact (ξ R (G), {i}), w i ∈ graph(v R ), exploiting the certificate c {i} (see the proof of Theorem 4.8).
Assume now that x is an imputation. Then, we observe that for each pair of players i and j, we can compute the value s i,j (x) by means of a binary search over the range of the possible values for the worth functions, by using an NP oracle. Indeed, for any value h in this range, we can decide in NP whether there is a coalition S ∈ I i,j such that e(S, x) > h, by guessing the coalition S, its worth w = v R (ξ R (G), S) together with a (polynomial) certificate c S , and then by checking in polynomial time that in fact S ∈ I i,j , that (ξ R (G), S), w ∈ graph(v) (by exploiting c S ), and that e(S, x) > h, where e(S, x) = w − x(S).
Finally, note that, being R a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation, v R (·, ·) is polynomially balanced, meaning that there exists a fixed integer k such that, for every game G in C(R), ||v R (ξ R (G), S)|| ≤ || ξ R (G), S || k for every coalition S, and hence the worth value of every coalition in G (of every G ∈ C(R)) cannot exceed the largest (positive or negative) value representable in the polynomial size || ξ R (G), S || k . By this, the above binary search allows us to find the maximum excess in at most polynomially many steps. Therefore, by using polynomially-many oracle calls, we may check in polynomial time that for each pair of distinct players i and j such that x j = v({j}), it is the case that s i,j (x) ≤ s j,i (x).
From this result and Corollary 5.5, we immediately get the following completeness result.
Corollary 5.7. Let R be any non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation such that GG e R (e.g., R = MCN ). On the class C(R), KernelCheck is ∆ P 2 -complete.
Tractable Classes of Graph Games
Many NP-hard problems in different application areas ranging, e.g., from AI [25] and Database Theory [26] to Game theory [27] , are known to be efficiently solvable when restricted to instances whose underlying structures can be modeled via acyclic graphs or nearly-acyclic ones, such as those graphs having bounded treewidth [11] . Indeed, on these kinds of instances, solutions can usually be computed via dynamic programming, by incrementally processing the acyclic (hyper)graph, according to some of its topological orderings. In this section, we shall show that this is also the case for the kernel of bounded treewidth graph games.
Our result is established by showing that this concept can be expressed in terms of an optimization problem over Monadic Second Order Logic (MSO) formulas, and by subsequently applying Courcelle's Theorem [12] and its generalization to optimization problems due to Arnborg, Lagergren, and Seese [13] . Thus, we first review the concepts of treewidth and MSO, and their relationship as it appears from Courcelle's Theorem.
Treewidth.
A tree decomposition of a graph G = (N, E) is a pair T, χ , where T = (V, F ) is a tree, and χ is a labeling function assigning to each vertex p ∈ V a set of vertices χ(p) ⊆ N , such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) for each node b of G, there exists p ∈ V such that b ∈ χ(p); (2) for each edge (b, d) ∈ E, there exists p ∈ V such that {b, d} ⊆ χ(p); and, (3) for each node b of G, the set {p ∈ V | b ∈ χ(p)} induces a connected subtree.
The width of T, χ is the number max p∈V (|χ(p)| − 1). The treewidth of G, denoted by tw(G), is the minimum width over all its tree decompositions. It is well-known that a graph G is acyclic if and only if tw(G) = 1. Deciding whether a given graph has treewidth bounded by a fixed natural number k is known to be feasible in linear time [28] .
MSO. Monadic Second Order (MSO) logic formulae over graphs are made up of the logical connectors ∨, ∧, and ¬, the membership relation ∈, the quantifiers ∃ and ∀, vertices variables and vertex sets variables-in addition, it is often convenient to use symbols like ⊆, ⊂, ∩, ∪, and → with their usual meaning, as abbreviations.
Courcelle [12] and other authors considered an extension of MSO, called MSO 2 , where variables for edge sets are also allowed. The fact that an MSO 2 sentence φ holds over a graph G is denoted by G |= φ.
The relationship between treewidth and MSO 2 is illustrated next. For a positive constant k, let hereafter C k be a class of graphs having treewidth bounded by k. For a graph G = (N, E), we denote by ||G|| its size, which is measured as the number of its nodes plus the number of its edges, i.e., ||G|| = |N | + |E| Proposition 5.8 (Courcelle's Theorem [12] ). Let φ be a fixed MSO 2 sentence. For each G ∈ C k , deciding whether G |= φ or not is feasible in linear time (w.r.t. ||G||).
An important generalization of MSO 2 formulae to optimization problems was presented by Arnborg et al. [13] . Next, we state a simplified version of these kinds of problems. Optimization problems are defined over MSO 2 formulae containing free variables and over graphs that are weighted on both nodes and edges.
Let G = (N, E), f N , f E be a weighted graph where f N and f E are the lists of weights associated with nodes and edges, respectively. Then, f N (v) (resp., f E (e)) denotes the weight associated with v ∈ N (resp., e ∈ E). For the weighted graph G = (N, E), f N , f E , its size ||G|| is measured as the sum of |N | + |E| plus all values in the lists f N and f E . Note that this is equivalent to state that weights are encoded in unary notation and that ||G|| is measured as the sum of |N | + |E| plus all the bits that that are necessary to store the lists f N and f E .
Let φ(X, Y ) be an MSO 2 formula over the graph (N, E), where X and Y are the free variables occurring in φ, with X (resp., Y ) being a vertex (resp., edge) set variable. For a pair of interpretations z N , z E mapping X to subsets of N and Y to subsets of E, we denote by φ[ z N , z E ] the MSO 2 formula (without free variables) where X and Y are replaced by the sets z N (X) and z E (Y ), respectively.
A solution to φ over G is a pair of interpretations
A solution of minimum cost is said optimal.
Theorem 5.9 (simplified from Arnborg et al. [13] ). Let φ be a fixed MSO 2 sentence. For each weighted graph G = (N, E), f N , f E such that (N, E) ∈ C k , computing an optimal solution to φ over G is feasible in (deterministic) polynomial time (w.r.t. ||G||).
A Tractable Class. Now that we have discussed the preliminary notions and concepts related to treewidth and MSO, we are in the position of stating our tractability result.
Theorem 5.10. Let G = (N, E), w be a graph game such that (N, E) ∈ C k , and let x be a payoff vector. Then, deciding whether x ∈ K (G) is feasible in polynomial time (w.r.t. ||G||).
Proof. Since we can check in polynomial time whether x is an imputation, by Definition 5.1 we have just to show that checking whether the condition s i,j (x) > s j,i (x) ⇒ x j = v({j}) holds is feasible in polynomial-time. We prove that s i,j (x) may be computed in polynomial time for each each pair of players i = j, which clearly entails the above tractability result.
For each X ⊆ N and Y ⊆ E, consider the following MSO 2 formula, stating that Y is the set of all those edges e ∈ E such that e ⊆ X:
Let w E and w N be such that w E ({v, v ′ }) = −w({v, v ′ }) and w N (v) = x v , and observe that max S⊆N e(S, x) = −1 * opt, where opt = min S⊆N (x(S) − v(S)) is the cost of an optimal solution to proj(X, Y ) over (N, E), w N , w E .
Recall, now, that s i,j (x) = max S∈Ii,j e(S, x). Therefore, in order to exploit the above MSO formula for its computation, we have to make sure that the set of considered coalitions is restricted to I i,j . We thus modify the weights of i and j in G so that, in any optimal solution of the above formula, i ∈ X and j / ∈ X, and thus max S⊆N e(S, x) coincides with s i,j . Let B = max e∈E abs(w E (e)) be the largest weight (in absolute value) among all edges of the graph. Then, replace the weights for nodes i and j as follows: w N (i) = −1 − |{e ∈ E | i ∈ e}| * B and w N (j) = 1 + |{e ∈ E | j ∈ e}| * B. It is straightforward to check that any optimal solution for this modified graph is attained at some set S that includes i and does not include j. From its value, say opt ′ , we may easily compute the desired value s i,j (x) as −1 * (opt ′ + x i − w N (i)). Hence, by Theorem 5.9 and the above MSO 2 formula, s i,j is computable in polynomial time, and thus the membership of x in K (G) can be decided in polynomial time, too.
The Complexity of the Bargaining Set
The concept of bargaining set was defined by Aumann and Maschler [29] (see also Maschler [30] ). We start by recalling its formal definition.
Let G = N, v be a coalitional game, and x ∈ X(G) be an imputation. Let S ⊆ N be a coalition, and y be an S-feasible payoff vector (i.e., y(S) = v(S)). The pair (y, S) is an objection of player i against player j to x if i ∈ S, j / ∈ S, and y k > x k for all k ∈ S.
A counterobjection to the objection (y, S) of i against j to x is a pair (z, T ) where j ∈ T , i / ∈ T , and z is a T -feasible payoff vector such that z k ≥ x k for all k ∈ T \ S and z k ≥ y k for all k ∈ T ∩ S. If there does not exist any counterobjection to (y, S), we say that (y, S) is a justified objection. Consider the imputation x such that x a = 8, x b = 10, and x c = 24. An objection of player c against player a to x is ( (12, 28) , {b, c}). Player a can counterobject to this objection using ((8, 12) , {a, b}). Another objection of player c against player a to x is ( (14, 26) , {b, c}). In this case, player a cannot counterobject. The reason is that coalition {a, b} receives a payoff 20 and this is not sufficient for player a to counterobject since she needs at least 8 for herself and at least 14 for player b, in order to respond to the proposal of player c. Therefore the imputation x does not belong to B(G). The intuitive reason is that player a receives too much, according to this profile.
Consider now the imputation
, and x ′ c = 24. We focus on the objections of player a against player c. We note that, in order to object, player a has to form the coalition S = {a, b}. The excess e(S, x) of S at x is 2, hence players a and b have the possibility to distribute among themselves a payoff of 2 to make the objection. But player c can always counterobject to player a because she can form the coalition T = {b, c} whose excess at x is 2 and hence she can always match the proposal made to player b by player a in order to object. A similar argumentation holds for every objection of every player against any other. Thus x ′ ∈ B(G). ⊳
It is well-known that K (G) ⊆ B(G) (hence, B(G) = ∅, whenever X(G) = ∅), and that C (G) ⊆ B(G) (see, e.g., [2] ). Thus, as in the case of the kernel, we shall just focus on the complexity of deciding whether a given payoff vector is in the bargaining set. The problem was conjectured to be Π P 2 -complete for graph games by Deng and Papadimitriou [3] . In this section, we show that the conjecture is indeed correct. Also, we are able to generalize the result by showing that membership in Π P 2 holds on any class of games C(R), where R is an NP representation scheme.
Hardness on Graph Games
It has been suggested by Maschler [30] that computing the bargaining set might be intrinsically more complex than computing the core. The result presented in this section provides some fresh evidence that this is indeed the case inasmuch as we show that the checking whether a payoff vector is in the bargaining set is Π P 2 -hard, even over graph games. The reduction is from the validity of quantified Boolean formulae.
Let Φ = (∀α)(∃β)φ(α, β) be an NQBF 2,∀ formula, i.e., a quantified Boolean formula over the variables α = {α 1 , . . . , α n } and β = {β 1 , . . . , β r }, where φ(α, β) = c 1 ∧ · · · ∧ c m is a 3CNF formula, and where each universally quantified variable α k ∈ α occurs only in the two clauses c i(k) = (α k ∨ ¬β k ) and cī (k) = (¬α k ∨ β k )-intuitively, each variable α k enforces the truth-value of 
a corresponding variable β k , which thus plays its role in the formula φ(α, β). Based on Φ, we define the weighted graph BS(Φ) = (N BS , E BS ), w such that (see Figure 6 for an illustration):
• The set N BS of the nodes (i.e., players) includes: a clause player c j , for each clause c j ; a literal player ℓ i,j , for each literal ℓ i occurring in c j ; and, two special players "chall" and "sat".
• The set E BS of edges includes three kinds of edges. Note that the size of the representation of all the weights is polynomial in the number of variables and clauses of Φ. Moreover, the following properties hold. Proof. The fact (A) that D ≤ m is immediate by construction. Moreover, the weight of each penalty edge is −m − 1 and, hence, (C) holds, too. Eventually, (D) (i.e., m ≥ 2 × n) is also immediate since Φ is an NQBF 2,∀ formula.
Let us, hence, focus on (B) by observing that e∈E BS |e ={chall,sat} w(e) ≤ −m−1, for E BS contains more penalty edges than positive ones. Thus, w({chall, sat})
Theorem 6.4. On the class C(GG) of graph games, BargainingSet-Check is Π P 2 -hard (even if the given payoff vector is an imputation). Proof. Deciding the validity of NQBF 2,∀ formulae is Π P 2 -complete [31] . Thus, given an NQBF 2,∀ formula Φ = (∀α)(∃β)φ(α, β) (where α = {α 1 , . . . , α n }, β = {β 1 , . . . , β r }, and φ(α, β) = c 1 ∧ · · · ∧ c m ), consider the graph game BS(Φ) = (N BS , E BS ), w and the imputation x that assigns m to sat, n − 1 to chall, and 0 to all other players. Note that x is an imputation, since v(N ) = m + n − 1 because of the weight of the edge {chall, sat} (recall that w({chall, sat}) = m + n − 1 − e∈E BS |e ={chall,sat} w(e)).
Beforehand, we note that the following properties hold on BS(Φ) and x.
Property 6.4. (1) . No player has a justified objection against a clause or a literal player. Indeed, any clause player c j receives 0 in x and is such that v({c j }) = 0. Therefore, she can counterobject to any objection through the singleton coalition {c j }. Similarly, any literal player ℓ i,j receives 0 in x and is such that v({ℓ i,j }) = 0, and can counterobject through {ℓ i,j }.
Property 6.4.(2).
No player has a justified objection against chall.
Assume that a player p ∈ N BS wants to object against chall through a coalition S. If v(S) < 0 then p cannot object against anyone. Indeed, she has to propose an S-feasible vector y such that y k > x k for all player k ∈ S, and hence v(S) = y(S) > x(S), but x(S) ≥ 0 by definition, so player p cannot fulfill this requirements if v(S) < 0. Then, because of Lemma 6.3.(C), S does not include penalty edges. In particular, for each universally quantified variable α k , it holds that |S∩{α
where c i(k) and cī (k) are the two clauses where this variable occurs (recall that Φ is an NQBF 2,∀ formula).
Consider, then, the coalition
Note that v(T ) = n and x(T ) = x chall = n − 1. Then, consider the vector z such that z chall = x chall = n − 1 and z q = 1 n > x q = 0 for each q ∈ T with q = chall, and observe that z(T ) = v(T ). Eventually, since T ∩ S = ∅, (z, T ) is a counterobjection to any objection of p against chall through S. Suppose that a player p = chall has an objection (y, S) against sat to x. Since sat ∈ S, it is the case that {chall, sat} ⊆ S and hence, by Lemma 6.3.(A), that v(S) ≤ m. Then, we claim that (z, {sat, chall}) is a counterobjection to (y, S) of p against sat, where z is a feasible distribution that assigns m to sat and w({chall, sat}) − m to chall. In fact, by Lemma 6.3.(B), chall receives a payoff strictly greater than m (i.e., z chall > m). Then, note that z sat = x sat and let us distinguish two cases.
In the case where chall ∈ S, we have that z chall > m ≥ n − 1 = x chall (recall that m ≥ 2 × n, by Lemma 6.3.(D)). Instead, in the case where chall ∈ S, we have that z chall > m while y chall ≤ v(S) ≤ m, and hence z chall > y chall . It follows that in both cases (z, {sat, chall}) is a counterobjection to (y, S).
In the light of the properties above, we can limit our attention to the objections of chall against sat. Consider an objection (y, S) of chall against sat to x. In particular, y chall must be greater than x chall = n − 1 and y q > 0 = x q for each q ∈ S with q = chall. Thus, y(S) = v(S) > n − 1.
Then, because of Lemma 6.3.(C), in order for such a coalition S to be such that v(S) > n − 1, no penalty edge must be covered by S. Moreover, given that chall ∈ S, we have that S must contain exactly one player per universally quantified variable so that v(S) = n > n − 1, i.e., |S| = n + 1 and |S ∩ {α k,i(k) , ¬α k,ī(k) }| = 1, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By this, the objection y has to be a vector such that y(S) = n, y chall > n − 1, and y q > 0, for each q ∈ S with q = chall. Note that the coalition S encodes an assignment σ S for the variables in α such that α k evaluates to false (resp., true) in σ S if α k,i(k) (resp., ¬α k,ī(k) ) occurs in S-note that in this correspondence the truth values are inverted with respect to the membership of the corresponding literal players in S.
Moreover, note that for each truth assignment σ for the variables in α, we may immediately build a coalition S and a vector y such that (y, S) is an objection of chall against sat, and σ S = σ. Therefore, objections of chall against sat are in correspondence with truth assignments for universally quantified variables.
We are now ready to show that Φ is valid if and only if x is in B(BS(Φ)):
(⇒) Assume that Φ = (∀α)(∃β)φ(α, β) is valid, and let (y, S) be any objection of chall against sat to x. We show that this objection is not justified, because sat has a counterobjection (z, T ). Recall first that S encodes an assignment σ S over the variables in α. Then, let σ be a satisfying assignment over the variables in Φ such that α k evaluates to true in σ if and only if it evaluates to true in σ S ; indeed, such a satisfying assignment σ exists since Φ is valid. Based on σ, let us construct the coalition T such that T ⊆ {sat} ∪ {ℓ i,j | ℓ i evaluates to true in σ ∧ c j is a clause where ℓ i occurs} ∪ {c 1 , . . . , c m }, T ∩ S = ∅, |T | = 2m + 1, and v(T ) = m. In particular, T can be such that v(T ) = m, precisely because σ is a satisfying assignment and by construction of σ S . Moreover, consider the vector z such that z sat = v(T ) = x sat = m and z q = x q = 0 for each q ∈ T with q = sat (and, hence, q ∈ S). By construction (z, T ) is a counterobjection to (y, S), which is therefore not justified in its turn.
(⇐) Let σ be an assignment over the variables in α witnessing that Φ is not valid. Let (y, S) be an arbitrary objection of chall against sat to x such that σ S = σ. We claim that (y, S) is justified. Indeed, assume for the sake of contradiction that (y, S) is not justified and let (z, T ) be a counterobjection. Since sat ∈ T \ S and since we must have z sat ≥ x sat = m, because of Lemma 6.3.(A) we actually have that z sat = x sat . In fact, since m is the maximum available payoff over all the coalitions not including both chall and sat, z(T ) = v(T ) = m and the fact that (z, T ) is a counterobjection to (y, S) together entail that S ∩ T = ∅. Also, these entail that T contains all clause players, exactly one literal player per clause, so that |T | = 2m + 1. Observe now that T encodes a satisfying truth value assignment σ T for φ(α, β), because v(T ) > 0 and hence T does not cover any penalty edge. More precisely, we let each variable γ i (either γ i = α i or γ i = β i ) to evaluate true (resp., false) in σ T if γ i,j (resp., ¬γ i,j ) occurs in T , for some clause c j . Let σ α T denote the restriction of σ T over the variables in α. Then, since S ∩ T = ∅ and given the definition of σ S , we have that σ S = σ α T . Clearly, this contradicts the fact that σ = σ S witnesses that Φ is not valid.
Again, by the same argument used for the proof of Proposition 4.3, the above result extends to compact representations more expressive than graph games. Corollary 6.5. Let R be any compact representation such that GG e R (e.g., R = MCN ). On the class C(R), BargainingSet-Check is Π P 2 -hard.
Membership on FNP Representation Schemes
As for the result pertaining checking whether a payoff vector belongs to the bargaining set, it has already been argued by Deng and Papadimitriou that this problem is in Π P 2 for graph games [3] . Indeed, they observed that one may decide that an imputation x is not in the bargaining set by firstly guessing in NP the objection (y, S), and then by calling a co-NP oracle, through which to check that there is no counterobjection (z, T ) to (y, S). However, to apply this argument one typically assumes to consider real values with fixed-precision (or it should be proven that there always exist suitable objections and counterobjections that may be guessed in polynomial-time).
Our main achievement in this section is to show that membership in Π P 2 can be established, independently of the precision adopted to represent the real values of interest in the game. To this end, we shall provide a useful characterization of a player i having a justified objection against some player j. The result is in the spirit of one of Maschler [32] 's and connects the existence of a justified objection of i against j to some algebraic conditions to hold on coalitions that i and j (may) belong to. Lemma 6.6. Let G be a coalitional game, and let x be an imputation of G. Then, player i has a justified objection against player j to x through coalition S ∈ I i,j if and only if there exists a vector y ∈ R S such that:
(1) y(S) = v(S); (2) y k > x k , for each k ∈ S; and, (3) v(T ) < y(T ∩ S) + x(T \ S), for each T ∈ I j,i .
Proof.
(⇒) Assume that player i has a justified objection against player j to x through coalition S ∈ I i,j . Let (y, S) be such justified objection and note that, by definition, y(S) = v(S) and y k > x k for each k ∈ S hold. Assume now, for the sake of contradiction, that (3) above does not hold. LetT ∈ I j,i be such that v(T ) ≥ y(T ∩ S) + x(T \ S). Based onT , let us build a vector z ∈ RT such that: (i) z k = x k + δ for each k ∈T \ S; and, (ii) z k = y k + δ for each k ∈T ∩ S, where
Note that z(T ) = v(T ) holds by construction. Hence, (z,T ) is a counterobjection to (y, S), a contradiction.
(⇐) Assume that there is a vector y ∈ R S such that all the three conditions above hold. Consider the pair (y, S) (with S ∈ I i,j ) and note that due to (1) and (2), (y, S) is in fact an objection of player i against player j. We now claim that (y, S) is justified. Indeed assume, for the sake of contradiction, that a counterobjection (z,T ) (withT ∈ I j,i ) exists such that: z(T ) = v(T ), z k ≥ x k for each k ∈T \ S, and z k ≥ y k for each k ∈T ∩ S. In this case, it holds that v(T ) = z(T ) ≥ y(T ∩ S) + x(T \ S), which contradicts (3).
Theorem 6.7. Let R be a non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation. On the class C(R), BargainingSet-Check is feasible in Π P 2 .
Proof. Let G ∈ C(R) be a coalitional game, and x be a payoff vector. W.l.o.g., we assume that x is an imputation, since checking this condition is feasible in Π P 2 (see the proof of Theorem 5.6).
Consider the complementary problem of deciding whether x ∈ B(G). We are going to show that this is feasible in Σ P 2 . In the light of Lemma 6.6, x ∈ B(G) if and only if there exist two players i and j, and a coalition S ∈ I i,j such that the set W (i, j, S) = {y ∈ R S |y(S) = v R (ξ R (G), S)∧ y k > x k , ∀k ∈ S∧ v R (ξ R (G), T ) < y(T ∩ S) + x(T \ S), ∀T ∈ I j,i } is not empty. Thus, the problem can be solved by guessing in NP the players i and j and the set S ∈ I i,j , and then by asking an NP oracle to decide whether W (i, j, S) is empty or not. In the latter case, we conclude that x ∈ B(G).
In order to show that this set is empty, the NP oracle may proceed as follows: it guesses at most m ≤ |S| + 1 coalitions T 1 , . . . T m ∈ I j,i , plus their worth values w 1 , . . . , w m , and the associated certificates to check that actually (ξ R (G), T ℓ ), w ℓ ∈ graph(v R ), ∀1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m. Moreover, it guesses the worth value v R (ξ R (G), S) and a suitable certificate c S for it. Then, by exploiting these certificates, the oracle checks in (deterministic) polynomial time that all guessed worth values are correct, as well as that the coalitions T 1 , . . . T m belongs to I j,i and that S belongs to I i,j . Moreover, it computes the inequalities defined by the first two rows in the above expression, plus the inequalities associated with the guessed coalitions T 1 , . . . T m ∈ I j,i . Finally, it checks in (deterministic) polynomial time whether this sub-system of at most 2(|S| + 1) ≤ 2n inequalities has some solution or not. In the latter case the oracle accepts, that is, it answers that W (i, j, S) = ∅.
To see that this procedure is correct, note that W (i, j, S) is defined by the intersection of a finite number of convex regions of R S and hence, by Proposition 4.4 (Helly's theorem), if W (i, j, S) is empty then there exist a set E including (at most) |S| + 1 of its defining convex regions (here, inequalities) witnessing its emptiness. Therefore, if this is the case, there exists some accepting computation of the oracle where the inequalities associated with the m ≤ |S| + 1 guessed coalitions plus the |S| + 1 inequalities associated with the first two rows of the above expression includes E, and thus the considered sub-system of inequalities has no solutions and it is a (succinct) witness that W (i, j, S) = ∅.
From this result and Corollary 6.5, we immediately get the following completeness result.
Corollary 6.8. Let R be any non-deterministic polynomial-time compact representation such that GG e R (e.g., R = MCN ). On the class C(R), BargainingSetCheck is Π P 2 -complete.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a complete picture of the complexity issues arising with the notions of core, kernel, and bargaining set on compactly specified coalitional games. On the one hand, we have exhibited membership results that apply to any arbitrary NP representation scheme for coalitional games. On the other hand, the corresponding hardness results have been proven on the setting of graph games (which is a very simple P representation scheme); hence, these hardness results apply to marginal contribution networks and to any representation scheme that is at least as expressive as graph games. Our results confirmed two conjectures by Deng and Papadimitriou [3] , and positively answer an open question posed by Ieong and Shoham [6] .
Since the three analyzed solutions concepts turned out to be computationally intractable in general, it is worthwhile looking for natural and expressive enough classes of games where these solutions concepts can be efficiently computed. This question has received only partial answers so far. It has been shown, by Ieong and Shoham [6] , that deciding core non-emptiness and deciding whether a payoff vector belongs to the core are problems feasible in polynomial time on classes of marginal contribution networks having bounded treewidth. In this paper, we have further explored this avenue of research, by showing the tractability of the kernel over graph games having bounded treewidth. However, the tractability frontier for such solution concepts is far from being completely charted. In particular, it remains an open problem to establish whether the kernel remains tractable on classes of marginal contribution networks having bounded treewidth, and whether the bounded treewidth is also the key for establishing tractability results when the bargaining set is considered.
